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INTRODUCTION
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."1 The Supreme Court has never inter-
preted this provision to require that a statute treat every person identi-
cally in all circumstances: statutory classifications are not per se uncon-
stitutional.2 Rather, the Court has held that different types of statutory
classifications must be subjected to different standards of review.' The
lowest level of equal protection review, generally applicable to eco-
nomic and social welfare legislation,4 requires that the statutory classi-
fication be rationally related to the statutory goal.5 The Court exercises
a more exacting standard of review, however, when the law employs a
"suspect" classification such as race or national origin,' or infringes
upon a "fundamental right" such as the right to interstate travel.
7 If
the law discriminates against such a suspect group or trenches upon a
fundamental right, then the Court employs "strict" equal protection
scrutiny, requiring that the statutory classification be necessary to fur-
ther a compelling state interest.8
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
" See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("The Constitution does not re-
quire things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they
were the same.") (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see also Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("[T]he 'equal protection of the laws'
required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the States from resorting to
classification for the purposes of legislation.").
' See generally G. GuNTHnni, CoNsTrrrrIoNAL LAW 670-971 (10th ed. 1980 &
Supp. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMEmcAN CoNsTrrtrnroNAL LAW §§ 16-1 to 16-57, 991-
1136 (1978 & Supp. 1982). For an extensive list of sources that discuss modem equal
protection caselaw, see Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Equal Protec-
tion-A Texas Statute Which Withholds State Funds for the Education of Illegal Alien
Children and Permits Local School Districts to Deny Enrollment to Such Children
Does Not Further a Substantial State Interest and Therefore Violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 ViLL. L. REv. 198, 202 n.19 (1982).
4 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
5 Id. at 485-87.
1 See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibited
marriage between blacks and whites); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954)
(selection process for jury service excluded Americans of Mexican descent).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
' See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
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The level of review a court chooses to apply is extremely impor-
tant because it often determines the outcome of a given case. Strict scru-
tiny creates a strong presumption that the statute is unconstitutional.
Rationality scrutiny, on the other hand, is a much more deferential
standard of review under which a statute can easily pass constitutional
muster.
In Dandridge v. Williams,'0 the Supreme court held that equal
protection challenges to welfare legislation would be reviewed under
the most deferential version of the rational relationship test: the welfare
statute must be upheld so long as the statutory classification could con-
ceivably be related to the statutory goal."1 This decision has made suc-
cessful equal protection challenges to discriminatory welfare laws al-
most impossible, regardless of how harsh or arbitrary a law may be. 2
Courts have not been uniformly satisfied with the constraints the
Dandridge doctrine has placed on them. In 1983, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in Price v. Cohen"s reviewed an equal protection
challenge to a recently enacted Pennsylvania welfare statute."" The
statute classified recipients between the ages of eighteen and forty-five
as "transitionally needy" unless they fit into certain exceptions. Those
who fit into these exceptions and those over forty-five years old were
classified as "chronically needy." While the chronically needy were en-
titled under the statute to year-round public assistance, the transition-
ally needy were eligible for benefits for only three months of each year.
For a succinct description of the "two-tier" framework of equal protection analysis in
which the Court applied either "strict" or "rationality" scrutiny, see San Antonio In-
dep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
" See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
10 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
" Id. at 485-87. In Dandridge, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge
to a Maryland welfare law that set a maximum limit for AFDC grants to families
above a certain size, regardless of the number of additional children. Under the statute,
large families received smaller AFDC payments per child than small families, even
when the children were equally needy. Id. at 477-78; see also id. at 490 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The Court held that this disparate treatment did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause since the statute was "rationally based." Id. at 485-87.
The Court explicitly held that this deferential standard of equal protection review
should be applied even though welfare laws involve "the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings." Id. at 485. The Court stated, "[T]he intractable eco-
nomic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance
programs are not the business of this Court." Id. at 487.
"2 Although this is generally true, the Court has indicated some reluctance in ap-
plying Dandridge to particularly harsh laws. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying
text.
18 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983).
14 Id. at 89-90.
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The statute eliminated public assistance to the transitionally needy for
nine months of each year.
15
Considering itself bound by the language of Dandridge,'8 the
Third Circuit felt compelled to apply minimum rationality scrutiny,
even though it expressed "considerable doubt about the appropriateness
of the extremely deferential approach taken by the Supreme Court." 7
The court reluctantly upheld the challenged statute as constitutional, on
the grounds that it had a conceivable rational basis.1"
When the Third Circuit heard the case, approximately 60,000 to
90,000 transitionally needy Pennsylvania residents faced a cut-off of
their benefits after three months. 9 The Price court found that those
recipients being cut off had no adequate alternative source of public
welfare and that private charities were unable to assist the indigents on
a long-term basis. Since the recipients tended to be unskilled and to
have a poor work history, their employment prospects were bleak. 20
Affidavits submitted by public welfare and private charity administra-
tors stated that many of the transitionally needy who had been cut off
had no means by which to pay for food or rent and were thus forced to
survive in the streets.21 The Price court observed that one of the named
plaintiffs faced the "possibility that she would be forced out into the
streets for the entire last trimester of her pregnancy." The court noted
the statute's harsh effects: "At a time when her health and nourishment
are of exceptional importance to her child's development, a pregnant
woman is denied assistance."1
2
The statute's denial of welfare thus threatened an interest in bare
subsistence. Because of the nature of the interest involved, the Third
Circuit thought a searching inquiry into the statutory classification was
needed. The Court asserted that "[w]ere this a matter of first impres-
sion, we might conclude that subsistence is impliedly protected by the
Constitution, because it is of basic human importance and fundamental
15 Id.
16 Id. at 94.
17 Id. at 96. See also id. at 94-96.
18 Id. at 96.
" Brief for Appellees at 2 n.1, Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983) [here-
inafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
20 Price, 715 F.2d at 90-91.
21 See Appeal from the Order of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, Appendix, at 113a-126a, Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Appendix]; see also Price, 715 F.2d at 90-91.
2 715 F.2d at 91. Pennsylvania has since made some policy changes to rectify this
situation. Women expecting their first child are now eligible for the AFDC program
during the last three months of pregnancy. See Philadelphia Inquirer, March 3, 1984,
at B1, col. 6.
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to the meaningful exercise of all other rights. 123 Finding Dandridge on
point, however, the court upheld the statute under a rational basis
standard.
This Comment will argue that in certain situations like Price
courts should not feel bound by Dandridge to apply minimal scrutiny
to harsh and arbitrary welfare laws. Traditional equal protection the-
ory has changed considerably since the Dandridge decision in 1970.24
Courts are no longer bound by two rigid tiers of scrutiny. In recent
years, there has developed an intermediate level of equal protection re-
view that requires more of a statutory classification than a mere ra-
tional relationship, but that is less demanding than the strict scrutiny
standard. Under this middle tier of review, a statutory classification
must be substantially related to an important state interest.25 When a
statute discriminatorily denies subsistence' to what this Comment will
define as a "sensitive" class, intermediate scrutiny can and should be
applied.
In support of this thesis, part I of the Comment will trace the
Supreme Court's development of intermediate scrutiny to show that
generally, when a law discriminates against a class with certain charac-
teristics, the Court will apply heightened scrutiny. Part I will also at-
tempt to identify these triggering characteristics and to define a sensi-
tive class as one possessing one or more of these characteristics. Finally,
part I will consider a recent innovation suggested by the 1982 Supreme
Court case Plyler v. Doe": in certain cases a combination of factors
may be necessary to justify the application of heightened scrutiny. In
these cases the sensitive status of a group may not, by itself, be suffi-
dent to justify the application of intermediate scrutiny. However, when
this group has been denied an interest that is both important and has a
close nexus with the exercise of constitutional rights, such heightened
scrutiny is triggered.
Part II of the Comment will show how the Plyler principle, when
applied to welfare laws, can be used by courts to invoke intermediate
scrutiny when these laws discriminatorily deny subsistence to sensitive
classes. It will also explain how this application is not inconsistent with
the mandate of Dandridge and its progeny. Finally, part III of the
Comment will apply the theory derived from Plyler to Price v. Cohen
to demonstrate the practical difference such a principle can make in the
23 Price, 715 F.2d at 93.
24 See infra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
2C Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
26 For this Comment's definition of subsistence, see infra text preceding note 94.
27 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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outcome of a case.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERMEDIATE EQUAL
PROTECTION SCRUTINY
A. Traditional Theory: The Development of the Sensitive
Classification
Traditionally,28 the Court has applied two levels of equal protec-
tion scrutiny: strict review of laws that discriminate against suspect
classes or encroach on fundamental rights and rationality review for all
other laws.29 In the 1970's and early 1980's, without explicitly stating
that it was developing a new tier of equal protection review, the
Court began to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to cases involving
statutory discrimination against certain kinds of groups, particularly
women and illegitimate children.
The standard applied to these groups is noticeably more rigorous
than rationality scrutiny and requires the state to produce "credible
supporting evidence" that demonstrates a substantial relationship be-
tween the statutory classification and the statutory goal.3" In contrast,
under the rationality standard, a statutory classification that has a con-
ceivable rational basis will pass equal protection muster, even though
the state never produces evidence, by statistics or otherwise, supporting
the choice of that particular classification. 2 Thus, "pure speculation"
by the legislature will suffice under the rationality standard, but not
28 "Traditionally" refers to the Warren Court era (admittedly a short time hori-
zon). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 671-72. For a description of traditional, two-
tier equal protection doctrine, see Hetherton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 493 F. Supp. 82,
87-88 (D. Del. 1980).
29 See, e.g. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
30 See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
S Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982) (quoting In re Alien Children Educ.
Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 583 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd sub nom. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982)); see also id. at 229 ("State must support its selection of this group as the
appropriate target for exclusion"); id. at 230 (rejecting state's claim that statute served
a substantial interest by reasoning that "it is an interest that is most difficult to quanti-
fy"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-04 (1976) (analyzing at length and then re-
jecting as too weak statistical evidence purporting to show a relationship between statu-
tory classification and goal).
32 See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) ("[T]hose challenging the legis-
lative judgement must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classifi-
cation is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the govern-
mental decisionmaker."); see also id. at 110 n.28 (" 'The State is not compelled to
verify logical assumptions with statistical evidence.' ") (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976)); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970).
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) (quoting Firemen v. Chicago, R.I.
& P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968)) (The District Court does not have authority
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under the intermediate standard.
Although a majority of the Supreme Court has not explicitly rec-
ognized the existence of "sensitive" classes, the Court's application of
this heightened scrutiny to laws that employ gender and legitimacy
classifications indicates that the Court will de facto treat a class as sen-
sitive if it displays certain distinguishing characteristics.34 This section
of part I will attempt to identify these characteristics. In doing so, it is
instructive to first examine how the Court has defined a "suspect"
class.
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,35 the Court de-
scribed a suspect class as a "'discrete and insular'" minority 6 that has
been "'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of politi-
cal powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.' ,,37 Suspect classifications include race
and national origin.38 Under current equal protection doctrine, suspect
classifications trigger strict equal protection review.39
In Frontiero v. Richardson,4 ° a 1973 decision, a plurality of the
Court advocated treatment of gender as a suspect classification.41 A ma-
"'to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without convincing statistics in the
record to support it, the legislative viewpoint constitutes nothing more than . "pure
speculation."' ").
" Scholarly commentary supports recognition of "sensitive" classifications that
trigger intermediate scrutiny. Gunther asserts that "[e]fforts to expand the category of
• .. 'quasi-suspect' classification ...is one of the strands of the 'new equal protec-
tion,'" G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 862, and argues that such classifications that
have triggered heightened scrutiny have included "sex," "alienage," and "illegitimacy,"
id. at 862-63. Similarly, Tribe has argued that intermediate review can be triggered
if sensitive, although not necessarily suspect, criteria of classification are
employed. Thus the Court has stressed the role of increasingly outdated
stereotypes in the gender cases, and the place of a long history of disad-
vantageous treatment in the alienage and illegitimacy cases. Whether or
not the groups in question might qualify for treatment as 'discrete and
insular' minorities, they bear enough resemblance to such minorities to
warrant more than a casual judicial response when they are injured by
law.
L. TRIBE, supra, note 3 § 16-31 at 1090 (footnotes omitted).
85 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
86 Id. at 313 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938)).
8" 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
See supra note 6.
a See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312; cf. Comment, Suspect Classifications: A
Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REv. 407, 427-34 (1983) (criticizing the Court's suspect
class analysis for its lack of a cogent definition of "suspect class" and its focus on group
rather than on individual rights to equality).
40 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
41 Id. at 682-88. The plurality opinion in Froiiterio was written by Justice Bren-
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jority of the Court, however, has never endorsed this view.42 Instead, in
1976, the majority in Craig v. Boren,43 applied intermediate scrutiny to
a gender classification without deciding whether gender was suspect or
not. However, in holding that a gender classification must be substan-
tially related to an important state interest,44 the Craig Court articu-
lated a standard of review for a newly recognized kind of class. In ef-
fect, the Craig Court treated gender as a sensitive classification-not
entitled to strict scrutiny as a suspect class would be, but entitled to a
more exacting review than rationality scrutiny. Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting in Craig, noted that "[t]hough today's decision does not go so
far as to make gender-based classifications 'suspect,' it makes gender a
disfavored classification.
''45
While the Craig majority did not clearly articulate why it was
applying a higher standard of review to gender classifications,48 several
factors can be gleaned from the opinion. The Court implied that one
reason for applying intermediate scrutiny was that gender classifica-
tions often reflect "'archaic and overbroad' generalizations.' 47 Craig
thus suggests that the Court will apply heightened scrutiny to a classifi-
cation if it reflects inaccurate stereotypes that are not truly indicative of
a group's abilities.48
nan and joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall.
42 Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment without endorsing the treatment of
gender as a suspect classification. See id. at 691. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Blackmun concurred in the judgment but considered it unnecessary "in this
case to characterize sex as a suspect classification." Id. at 691-92. Justice Rehnquist
dissented. See id. at 691.
43 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
44 Id. at 197-99.
45 Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 190. The Craig majority argued that the standard that it was apply-
ing had been established by precedent. The Craig standard derived primarily from
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court struck down a gender classifica-
tion, relying on a rigorous version of the rationality standard from Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), which required that a classification have a "fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. The
Court in Craig did not apply the more deferential version of rationality scrutiny from
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), which stated that "[a] statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." Id. at 426 (citations and footnote omitted). In cases involving economic or social
welfare, the Court often employs the McGowan version of rationality scrutiny rather
than the Reed/Royster Guano "fair and substantial relation" test. See, e.g., Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Thus, the Craig majority's citation to Reed to
justify its standard of equal protection scrutiny does not fully explain why it was apply-
ing a more exacting level of scrutiny to gender than the deferential McGowan "conceiv-
able rational basis" test that it applies to many other classifications.
47 Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 (quoting Schlesinger, v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508
(1975)).
48 429 U.S. at 198-99.
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In addition, the majority decision in Craig can be reasonably ex-
plained as an unarticulated compromise between the old Frontiero plu-
rality, who had wanted to treat gender as a suspect class, and the other
justices, who were unwilling to go so far. The compromise appears to
treat women as entitled to some heightened level of review because they
were somewhat suspect. Under this approach, gender would be treated
as a sensitive classification because women had been subjected to some
discrimination-but not as much as a suspect class-and because they
had suffered from a certain degree of political powerlessness-but not
as severely as a suspect group."9
Gender is not the only classification that will invoke intermediate
level scrutiny. The Court's treatment of illegitimacy indicates that the
Court will also consider a classification as sensitive if it is based on a
personal characteristic over which an individual has no control. In sev-
eral recent cases the Court struck down state statutes of limitations for
paternity and child support suits brought on behalf of illegitimate chil-
dren.50 In holding that a shorter time period for illegitimate children
51
to bring suit was not substantially related to the legitimate state goal of
preventing fraudulent claims,52 the Court was de facto treating the ille-
gitimacy classification as sensitive. The Court justified its application of
intermediate scrutiny to the classification by noting that punishing a
group for a characteristic over which the group's members have no con-
trol is "'illogical and unjust' " and "'contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individ-
ual responsibility or wrongdoing.' ,,'
This brief summary of the gender and illegitimacy cases demon-
strates that the Court has relied upon at least three factors to indicate
the presence of sensitive classes: (1) a group that has suffered from the
same history of discriminatory treatment as a suspect class but in such
a milder form that the class itself does not qualify as suspect; (2) a
classification that reflects stereotypes that are archaic and overbroad or
not truly indicative of abilities; and (3) a personal trait over which the
individual has no control.
49 Cf id. at 217-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that the
absence of a history or pattern of discrimination against men as a class militates against
application of "any kind of special scrutiny." Id. at 219.
50 Pickett v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982). But see Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
51 Under the applicable state laws, a legitimate child had the right to seek support
from its natural father until the age of eighteen. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91,
100 N.7 (1982).
52 Id. at 101.
"I Pickett v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1983) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972)).
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In all of the above cases, the presence of the sensitive class Was, by
itself, sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny. In Plyler v. Doe,5 4 the
Court first applied intermediate scrutiny in a situation that also impli-
cated the other strand of equal protection: the fundamental interest.
The next section discusses the effect Plyler may have on intermediate
level scrutiny.
B. Plyler v. Doe
In Plyler v. Doe the Court applied intermediate equal protection
scrutiny to strike down a Texas law that denied free public education
to illegal alien children.5  Two potential rationales are suggested by
this result: either illegal aliens are a sensitive class or education, while
not fundamental,56 is a type of important right that triggers intermedi-
ate scrutiny.
The Court's opinion, while not a model of clarity, does not seem to
rely on either of these easily available routes. Rather, it suggests that a
combination of the two strands of equal protection influenced the
decision.
In part of the opinion, the Court applied the standard de facto
sensitive class analysis. 57 'While conceding that illegal alien children do
not constitute a suspect class, 58 the majority nevertheless justified appli-
cation of intermediate review by stressing that the challenged classifica-
tion was analogous to illegitimacy classifications that had triggered in-
termediate scrutiny: the law penalized illegal alien children for their
status, over which they had no control. 9 Furthermore, the Court indi-
cated that illegal aliens share many of the characteristics of a suspect
class, but in a milder form. It argued that they constitute a "disfa-
vored"60 "underclass"6 1 that is "'virtually defenseless against ...
- 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
'5 Id. at 223-24, 230.
Fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny. See supra notes 7-8 and accompany-
ing text. Only those rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are
considered fundamental. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 33-
34 (1973).
" Although the Plyler majority did not explicitly use the word "sensitive," it
again de facto applied such an analysis. The dissenters sharply criticized the majority
for employing a "quasi-suspect-class" rationale in order to justify application of an
intermediate standard of review. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 223.
5 Id. at 220; see also id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring). But see id. at 245 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Equal Protection Clause does not preclude
legislators from classifying among persons on the basis of factors and characteristics
over which individuals may be said to lack 'control' ").
60 Id. at 222.
61 Id. at 219.
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exploitation.' "62
However, beyond this standard theory, the Plyler analysis of ille-
gal alien children contains an important development in the de facto
treatment of certain groups as sensitive. The Court innovated by treat-
ing the sensitive status of illegal alien children as insufficient by itself to
justify application of intermediate scrutiny. Instead, it relied on a com-
bination of four factors to justify intermediate scrutiny, and did not
suggest that any combination of fewer elements could trigger such
heightened review. The first two factors were based solely on the sensi-
tive status of the class: (1) the statutory classification penalized in-
nocents for a trait over which they had no control;63 and (2) it harmed
the interest of a group that by virtue of its history of disfavored treat-
ment, is analogous to a suspect class." This section has identified these
factors as characteristics of a sensitive class.
The third factor stressed by the Plyler Court, however, was at
least partially derived from the importance of the interest at stake. The
Court was extremely concerned with the effect that the denial of the
statutory interest involved would have on the already sensitive class.
The Texas law in question tended to create a new, perhaps permanent,
underclass; by denying education to these illegal alien children, a new
subclass of illiterates was being created."5 The Court noted that
"[p]aradoxically, by depriving the children of any disfavored group of
an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise
the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority."66 Thus, a third
reason that the Court applied intermediate scrutiny was that the statute
tended to transform an already sensitive group into a permanent
underclass.
6 7
The fourth factor that the Plyler Court emphasized was the im-
portance of education and the devasting effect of its denial to children."8
While noting that public education is not a right explicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution,69 the Court felt that education had a "fundamental
62 Id. at 219 n.18 (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex.
1978), affd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)).
6 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 60-62.
65 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 ([T]he statute will "promot[e] the creation and perpetu-
ation of a subclass of illiterates."); see also id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("[T]he Texas scheme inevitably will create 'a subclass of illiterate persons.' ").
66 Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
617 Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Children denied an education are
placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated
child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.").
68 Id. at 221-24.
69 Id. at 221 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35
(1973)).
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role in maintaining the fabric of our society."'7 0 If the sensitive status of
illegal alien children had been sufficient to justify application of inter-
mediate scrutiny, then the Court's lengthy discussion of the importance
of education would not have been necessary. Thus, Plyler suggests that
sometimes a combination of a sensitive classification and the denial of
an important right is necessary to trigger intermediate scrutiny.
7 1
Although Plyler was admittedly based on a unique confluence of
factors, 2 the majority's reasons for treating education as an element
helping to trigger intermediate scrutiny suggest other interests that fit
the same description. It is therefore important to look at those
justifications.
While the rationale of Plyler is murky, apparently one of the rea-
70 Id. at 221.
71 Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-31, at 1090 n.10. Writing in 1978, considera-
bly before Plyler, Tribe argued that the Court had applied intermediate scrutiny in
cases that "combine[d] sensitive criteria of classification with important liberties." Id.
Tribe cited three cases to support this contention: Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973);
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See id. Tribe's analysis suggests that
Plyler did not represent an innovation inasmuch as it applied intermediate scrutiny to a
combination of the presence of a quasi-suspect classification and the denial of an im-
portant interest.
This Comment asserts, however, that Plyler is the first clear example of interme-
diate scrutiny being applied to such a combination. In Plyler the Court not only explic-
itly recognized the existence of the intermediate tier of review, but also explicitly ap-
plied it. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.16.
In contrast, the Court purported to apply rationality scrutiny in both Mow Sun
Wong, see 426 U.S. at 115-17, and Moreno, see 413 U.S. at 533-38. Even if the Court
actually applied heightened scrutiny in these cases, the cases do not represent clear
examples of intermediate review.
Stanley v. Illinois, the third case cited by Tribe, is a due process case that held
that the statute was unconstitutional because the classification did not permit rebuttal.
Requiring that rebuttal be permitted is a technique of intermediate review under
Tribe's analysis, but it is not an element of intermediate review under this Comment's
analysis. Thus, the disagreement between Tribe and this Comment regarding Stanley
simply reflects differing views as to the appropriateness of including the "irrebutable
presumption" doctrine in a definition of intermediate review.
72 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring) (stressing the "unique
character" of the case); id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's opinion
rests on such a unique confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for
little beyond the results in these particular cases.").
The majority in Plyler also attempted to claim that education was a uniquely
important interest. They argued that education is not "merely some governmental 'ben-
efit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the impor-
tance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its
deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction." Id. at 221.
The majority's rationale does not distinguish subsistence from education. Sub-
stance, even more than education, is essential to maintaining the basic institutions of
our society. Such institutions would crumble if citizens were denied the bare means of
survival. A denial of the means of subsistence can cause permanent physical and emo-
tional damage.
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sons the Court felt that the denial of education should help trigger in-
termediate scrutiny was that education has a close nexus with the exer-
cise of constitutional rights. To the extent this interpretation is correct,
it means that Plyler may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez73 and
must be seen as implicitly overruling at least a part of it.
In Rodriguez the Court rejected an argument that education is so
important and has such a close nexus with the effective exercise of first
amendment rights that it ought to be treated as a fundamental right.74
The majority reasoned that treating interests as fundamental simply be-
cause of their social or economic importance would improperly lead to
the creation of substantive constitutional rights in the name of equal
protection .7 The Court held that whether an interest is fundamental is
not determined by its societal importance; a right is fundamental only if
it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution .7
Furthermore, the Rodriguez Court noted that the plaintiff's
"nexus" argument with respect to education went too far since it would
lead to what the Court considered the reductio ad absurdum of height-
ened equal protection scrutiny of laws trenching on enterests in welfare
benefits and housing. Since statistics probably could be produced to
demonstrate that a deprivation of welfare or housing significantly
dampens the exercise of constitutional rights, a nexus analysis would
require the Court to treat these interests as fundamental.77 Such a re-
sult, noted the Court, would be contrary to its decisions in Dandridge
v. Williams78 and Lindsey v. Normet,79 in which the Court held that
welfare and housing were not fundamental interests.80
When Rodriguez was decided in 1973, the Court still assumed a
dichotomous equal protection universe in which the only levels of re-
view that could be applied were strict or rationality scrutiny.8 The
intermediate standard of equal protection review was not yet fully de-
veloped.82 Thus, since a nexus with constitutional rights was not suffi-
cient to make an interest fundamental and trigger strict scrutiny, the
Court held that rationality scrutiny must be applied.8"
73 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
74 Id. at 35.
75 Id. at 30-33.
76 Id. at 33-34.
77 Id. at 37.
78 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
79 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
1o Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
81 See id. at 17; see also id. at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 28-54.
8 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
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The dichotomous Rodriguez formulation fails to recognize how
closely interests such as education and subsistence are connected with
constitutional rights. A law that interferes with these interests may dis-
courage the exercise of constitutional rights even more than a law that
encroaches directly on what the Rodriguez Court would consider a fun-
damental right.8
The majority in Plyler seemed implicitly to recognize this reality.
They noted the importance of education "to participation in core politi-
cal institutions"'8 5 and in preparing "'individuals to be self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society.' "88 This reasoning is almost in-
distinguishable from the argument made by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez,
who contended thai the first amendment's "'marketplace of ideas' is an
empty forum for those lacking basic communicative tools"' 87 and that
our present democratic electoral process depended upon an intelligent
and "informed electorate." 88
In Plyler, the Court held that education is so important to the
exercise of certain fundamental rights that its denial to illegal alien
children could help trigger intermediate scrutiny. Inasmuch as the
Court was actually adopting a nexus argument without so naming it,
Plyler overruled sub silentio the rigid Rodriguez doctrine that relegated
interests with mere nexus to rationality scrutiny.8 9
This Comment argues that Plyler should be interpreted to stand
for the proposition that denial of an interest that is very important and
that has a very close nexus with the exercise of constitutional rights can
help trigger intermediate scrutiny.90 By so interpreting Plyler, the scope
of strict scrutiny could still be sharply restrained,91 while providing a
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rodriguez, pointed out this flaw by stating that
"[o]nly if we closely protect the related interests from state discrimination do we ulti-
mately ensure the integrity of the constitutional guarantee itself." Id. at 103 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
a Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 n.20.
86 Id. at 222 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
67 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
8 Id. at 36.
"g Rodriguez did not involve an absolute deprivation of education. The challenged
Texas scheme was a financing system that relied upon local property taxes. The plain-
tiffs contended that this system unfairly favored the students who lived in the more
affluent parts of the state. See id. at 1. It might be argued that the issue of how a
complete denial of an interest with a constitutional nexus should be treated was left
open in Rodriguez (and answered in Plyler). Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opin-
ion, explicitly noted that he felt Plyler left Rodriguez intact for this reason. See Plyler,
457 U.S. at 234-35.
90 See supra note 72. Plyler may involve such a unique combination of elements
triggering intermediate scrutiny that its application is precluded beyonds its specific
facts.
91 Strict scrutiny would still be limited to suspect classifications and denials of
1984]
1560 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:1547
first line of defense for constitutional rights by applying intermediate
scrutiny to infringements of related interests. Furthermore, such an in-
terpretation of Plyler would lessen the problem of distinguishing be-
tween rights implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution and those with a
close nexus because the result of the choice would be less drastic. A
judge could choose between applying strict or intermediate scrutiny,
rather than be forced into an all-or-nothing choice between strict scru-
tiny and deferential rationality scrutiny.
II. APPLICATION OF Plyler v. Doe TO WELFARE LAWS
The theory derived from Plyler v. Doe92 can be used to apply
heightened scrutiny to laws that would receive only minimal scrutiny
under Dandridge v. Williams.93 Subsistence, like education, should be
recognized by the courts as an important right whose denial to a sensi-
tive class triggers intermediate scrutiny. This suggestion, in apparent
conflict with the broad language of Dandridge, is in fact consistent
with the results of Dandridge and its progeny.
Section A of this part will examine the concept of subsistence in
more detail to show that it, like education, should be accorded impor-
tant right status. Section B will demonstrate that this conclusion will
not contravene the precedent set by Dandridge.
A. The Constitutional Importance of Subsistence
"Subsistence" denotes the bare means of survival-the food, shel-
ter, clothing, and medical care necessary to maintain life. This defini-
tion does not require that a needy person first die to be considered as
being deprived of subsistence. Subsistence is denied when the destitute
person is provided with such a low level of assistance (or no assistance
at all) that she would be incapable over the long run of keeping body
and soul together.
As defined by this Comment, subsistence does not include the
means necessary for a comfortable or decent lifestyle, but rather is lim-
ited solely to the bar means necessary for survival. Furthermore, a total
denial of one type of welfare does not necessarily constitute a denial of
subsistence because the recipient may be eligible for other assistance (or
may have alternative sources of income) and thus is not being deprived
of the means of staying alive.9
fundamental rights.
92 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
93 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
" Admittedly, this makes the determination whether a particular law denies sub-
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Since subsistence is not guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not
fundamental, and its infringement does not trigger strict scrutiny.
95
Nonetheless, subsistence like education, is so important to the exercise
of constitutional rights that its denial to a sensitive group should trigger
intermediate equal protection scrutiny. As the court noted in Goldberg
v. Kelly,9 termination of welfare benefits that forces an indigent into a
desperate struggle for survival renders that person practically incapable
of protecting her rights.9
It is not asserted here that a citizen has an affirmative constitu-
tional right to welfare, nor that the denial of subsistence by itself
should trigger heightened scrutiny. A state could deny welfare to all its
citizens without raising equal protection concerns. Rather, this Com-
ment is particularly concerned with laws that discriminatorily deny to
certain disadvantaged groups the basic means of survival. The defini-
tion employed herein of the traits characterizing a sensitive group is an
attempt to identify those factors that should warn a court that denial of
subsistence to a particular group is probably motivated by prejudice9 '
and is therefore so problematic under the equal protection clause as to
require scrutiny more demanding than that required under rationality
review.
In one drastic sense, subsistence is a necessary prerequisite to the
exercise of all constitutional rights because the deprivation of subsis-
tence for too long results in death. However, even when a denial of
sistence problematic. Since subsistence depends on a person's other available resources,
it may be that a law that cuts off one source of welfare denies subsistence to some, but
not to others. However, this possibility by itself should not dissuade a court from deter-
mining that the law in question denies subsistence. That the legislative classification in
question is broad enough to encompass also some who have other means of support
does not make it any more legitimate. Not all members of sensitive groups are in the
same stages of financial need; however, if it appears that a substantial percentage of
those the law affects are being denied subsistence, this should be sufficient for a court to
find that the law denies subsistence.
" See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32-34 & n.72
(1973).
( 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7 Id. at 264.
" See Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions:
Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 777, 804-
08 (1981). Although in many cases the denial of subsistence may be claimed to have
been motivated by a desire to cut expenses, under the intermediate standard of review
an interest in reducing government expenses is by itself insufficient to qualify as an
"important" or "substantial" state interest. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 ("[A] concern
for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used
in allocating those resources." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 249 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) ("Decisions following Reed
similarly have rejected administrative ease and convenience as sufficiently important
objectives to justify gender-based classifications." (citations omitted)).
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subsistence "merely" results in an indigent being unable to pay for food
or rent and forces her to try to survive as a "street person," 99 constitu-
tional rights can also be infringed.
The right to participate in state elections on an equal basis, once
the state grants the franchise, is a constitutional right conferred by the
equal protection clause. 00 This right is indirectly infringed upon by a
denial of subsistence, which can uproot a person from her residence if
she cannot pay her rent. Without a residence, an indigent is foreclosed
from registering to vote and thus loses the opportunity to participate in
our political system.
Similarly, a denial of subsistence interferes with the first amend-
ment rights of free speech, assembly, and petition. People forced to en-
gage in a desperate hand-to-mouth existence are relegated to margins of
society, without the resources or energy to communicate effectively with
other citizens or the government. In addition, the deprivation of subsis-
tence interferes with the constitutional right to interstate travel recog-
nized in Shapiro v. Thompson.1°1 The freedom to travel implies the
freedom to remain. Yet a denial of subsistence in one state puts strong
pressure on the poor to travel to another state to obtain the necessities
of life."°2
99 See Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing plight of
named plaintiffs who would probably be forced to try to survive on the street); see also
infra text accompanying notes 147-53 (discussing affidavits in Price describing how
many destitute persons have been forced into the streets by the termination of welfare
benefits).
100 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 n. 25 (1980); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
101 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
'02 Common sense would indicate that the denial of subsistence interferes with the
constitutional right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). If a
person is struggling just to keep herself alive, her freedom to make personal choices
regarding marriage, raising children, or abortion is severely circumscribed. Cf id. at
152-53 (discussing scope of constitutional right of privacy).
The Court has twice held, however, that the constitutional right to freedom to
make certain private choices does not carry with it a constitutional entitlement to be
provided with funds to remove an obstacle to freedom of choice caused by poverty. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-75
(1977). In these two cases, the Court held that an indigent woman's constitutional right
of privacy is not violated by a denial of welfare-funded abortions.
The Court's rationale in Harris v. McRae and Maher v. Roe implied that many
individual constitutional rights are defined negatively as rights to be free from govern-
ment interference with'a protected activity, rather than defined positively as guarantees
creating affirmative government obligations to provide the needy with the means neces-
sary to engage in the guaranteed activity. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 313-18; Maher, 432
U.S. at 473-77.
If all individual constitutional rights are defined solely in negative terms as the
right to be free from government interference with protected activities, and if govern-
ment denial of the means to engage in an activity to a destitute person who would not
otherwise have the means to engage in it is not government interference, then denial of
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Subsistence is relevant in another way. The denial of education in
Plyler was problematic because it tended to create a permanent under-
class of illiterates.103 Similarly, the denial of subsistence tends to trans-
form what may be a temporary state of need into a permanent one. A
person depending on public assistance is still capable of being a produc-
tive member of society. Forcing that person out into the street almost
guarantees the elimination of any productive potential. With no perma-
nent address and no resources, the chances of a "street person" finding
employment are almost nonexistent, particularly when her day-to-day
existence is caught up in merely trying to surviveY° ' Such indigents,
even more than those receiving welfare, should be treated as a disfa-
vored class in socikty.
Thus, the denial of subsistence is very similar to the denial of edu-
subsistence would never infringe on any constitutional right.
Even Maker and related cases, however, recognize that certain rights impose an
affirmative obligation on the government. Where the government has a monopoly over
a protected activity, see id. at 469 n.5, or compels participation in that activity, see id.
at 471 n.6, it has an affirmative obligation to provide the means of access to participate
in that activity. Thus in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held
that the state must provide indigents access to the legal means for obtaining a divorce,
an activity over which the state exercised a monopoly. See id. at 380-81; cf. United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (state can constitutionally require an indigent to
pay a court fee in order to obtain discharge in bankruptcy because discharge in bank-
ruptcy was not only way in which a debtor could obtain relief from his creditors).
Since the franchise is subject to a government monopoly, Maher and related cases
suggest that the right to vote imposes an affirmative obligation on the government to
provide the means of access to the ballot and further suggest that this right can be
infringed upon by a denial to the poor of the means of access. Thus a denial of subsis-
tence that indirectly forecloses participation in the ballot could infringe upon this right.
Indeed, the "government monopoly" exception to the Maher rule that rights are
negatively defined highlights the problems with the rule. If logically applied, the excep-
tion would swallow the rule. Any time a person is so indigent that she cannot afford to
participate in a protected activity without government aid, the government effectively
has a monopoly over that indigent person's participation in that right. This cre-
ates-under the government monopoly exception-an affirmative obligation on the part
of the state to provide the means of access to that activity.
In summary, even under a theory of constitutional rights that views such rights as
defined solely in negative terms except where the government has a monopoly on the
exercise of the right, the denial of subsistence interferes with the affirmative right to
participate on an equal basis in state elections (a government monopolized activity).
Thus subsistence has a nexus with constitutional rights, even if they are narrowly de-
fined. However, since such a strictly negative view of constitutional rights has not been
consistently applied (see, e.g., Plyler and Shapiro) and since its application would have
serious theoretical flaws, the Maher rule should not be construed as covering more than
the right to privacy. If constitutional rights other than an interest in subsistence are
defined in terms that are not solely negative, then the denial of subsistence would also
interfere indirectly with the right to interstate travel, and the exercise of the first
amendment rights of free speech, petition, and assembly.
10" See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
1o4 For a more extensive view of the bleak prospects facing a person living in the
street, see infra text accompanying notes 147-54.
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cation in two important ways: it indirectly infringes upon the exercise
of constitutional rights, and it tends to create a permanent underclass.
From Plyler, it follows that the denial of subsistence should be consid-
ered a factor that helps trigger intermediate scrutiny.
The range of "important" interests-those interests the depriva-
tion of which aid in invoking intermediate scrutiny- should be nar-
rowly construed. The importance of an interest is relevant for equal
protection analysis in only two ways. First, the importance of an inter-
est with a nexus with constitutional rights is relevant only to the extent
a deprivation of this related interest would result in a serious indirect
infringement of constitutional rights. In this respect, the societal impor-
tance of an interest that has no nexus with constitutional rights is not
relevant to equal protection analysis."0 5
The interest must be extremely important to the exercise of consti-
tutional rights in order for its denial to trigger intermediate scrutiny.
The Court in Plyler emphasized that education is of "'supreme impor-
tance.' "106 Only denials of interests of paramount importance, such as
education and subsistence, that are necessary prerequisites for the exer-
cise of constitutional rights should help trigger intermediate scrutiny.
Second, the importance of in interest is relevant to equal protection
analysis insofar as the denial of an important tool of self-help to a sen-
sitive group can create a permanent underclass. This argument derives
support from the Plyler rationale that denial of education to a discrete
class of children creates an "obstacle . . .to individual achievement"107
and thus "poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection
Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable
obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit."'08 In Plyler
the Court was concerned with this aspect of importance when it
stressed that "'it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.' ))109
Of course, the denial of any socially or economically important
interest to a group tends to lower that group's status in the community,
thereby creating an underclass. If the opportunity for advancement on
105 Tribe apparently believes that the deprivation of any socially or economically
important interest, such as an interest in retaining a driver's license or obtaining higher
education at an affordable tuition, should trigger intermediate review. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 3, § 16-31; at 1090. His view is arguably supported by Plyler v. Doe. In
Plyler, the Court helped justify intermediate scrutiny of a deprivation of education by
observing that education was important for an individual's cultural and social develop-
ment, as well as her economic advancement. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-23.
106 457 U.S. at 221 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)).
107 Id. at 222.
108 Id. at 221-22.
"o Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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the basis of personal merit remains open, however, members of the dis-
favored group have a chance to improve their position. In contrast, the
denial of the tools for self-help has a much stronger tendency to create
a society divided by caste since it not only "creat[es]" but also
"perpetuat[es] .. .a sub-class"11 by precluding members of the af-
fected group from improving their position through their own effort.
Thus, under the approach outlined here, the importance of an in-
terest is only relevant to equal protection analysis in two narrow as-
pects that are clearly tied to constitutional norms."1'
B. Reconciling Dandridge v. Williams
Dandridge v. Williams. 2 presents a major obstacle to the ap-
proach outlined above because the Supreme Court in that case seemed
to indicate that rationality scrutiny is to be applied to all welfare
laws." 83 However, Dandridge can, in a manner consistent with the de-
velopment of intermediate equal protection review, be interpreted to
permit intermediate scrutiny of public assistance laws that deprive a
sensitive group of subsistence.
In Dandridge and its progeny, the Court has never actually ap-
plied deferential rationality scrutiny to a law that denied subsistence. It
has only applied the conceivable rational basis test in cases where the
termination or reduction in welfare did not threaten an interest in
survival.
For example, Dandridge itself involved an equal protection chal-
lenge to a Maryland welfare statute that imposed a maximum limit on
110 457 U.S. at 230.
"" This narrow interpretation of the range of important interests whose depriva-
tion can help trigger intermediate scrutiny has significant advantages over a broader
interpretation. See supra note 105. Tribe's view that denial of a socially or economi-
cally important interest should trigger intermediate scrutiny creates the danger of wide-
spread judicial intervention unguided by constitutional norms. Almost any interest can
be viewed by someone as important. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) ("'Virtually every state statute affects important rights.' ").
The Constitution provides no guidance as to what interests are socially or econom-
ically important. Thus, Tribe's view would set judges loose upon legislative enactments,
armed with a relatively powerful weapon of judicial review, yet unguided (and unre-
strained) by clear constitutional values. Cf J. ELY, DzmocRACY AND DIsTRuST
(1980). Ely would argue that this Comment's approach is a form of "interpretivism"
that tries to limit judicial review to protecting values discoverable within the terms of
the written Constitution, and that Tribe's approach is a variant of "noninterpretivism"
that enforces norms that cannot be discovered within the Constitution. Ely contends
that both approaches are ultimately unworkable and that judicial review should be used
to facilitate the representation of minorities when necessary to correct the malfunction-
ing of the majoritarian political process due to prejudice.
112 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
111 Id. at 485.
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments to fami-
lies so that families with more than six members received the same flat
grant, regardless of the number of additional children."" Although this
statute operated to reduce the AFDC payment per child in large fami-
lies," 5 it did not deny subsistence (that is, the bare means of survival)
to these children. Dandridge upheld the challenged law on the grounds
that it was rational.' 6 Similarly, in Richardson v. Belcher,17 the
Court applied the rationality standard to uphold a statutory provision
that reduced social security benefits to offset workmen's compensation.
And, in Jefferson v. Hackney,""8 the Court applied deferential rational-
ity scrutiny in rejecting an equal protection challenge to a Texas law
that provided lower grants to AFDC recipients than to the aged who
received categorical assistance under the Social Security Act."'
In each of these cases the Court applied rationality scrutiny to
laws that reduced welfare benefits without threatening an interest in
subsistence. The results in these cases are thus not inconsistent with an
application of intermediate scrutiny to certain denials of subsistence.
The Court has been more reluctant to apply rationality scrutiny to
complete eliminations of welfare. An example of this wariness is
Schweiker v. Wilson,'20 which involved a due process challenge' 2 ' to a
federal statute that totally denied certain Social Security Income bene-
fits ($25 per month "comfort allowances") to patients institutionalized
in public mental hospitals that did not receive Medicaid funds for the
114 Id. at 474; see also id. at 490 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 477-78.
116 Id. at 486-87.
117 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
11 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
11 Id. at 545-49; see also Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (applying
rationality standard of equal protection scrutiny to uphold Oregon law requiring $25
appellate court filing fee; filing fee requirement had been challenged by plaintiffs seek-
ing judicial review of agency determinations that had reduced their welfare benefits). In
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Court applied rationality scrutiny to a
statute, the Hyde Amendment, that denied Medicaid funds to poor women for medi-
cally necessary abortions. Even this case did not involve a denial of the means of sur-
vival; under the Hyde Amendment, funds are denied for medically necessary abortions
"except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term . . . ." Id. at 302.
12 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
"' The plaintiffs attacked the "statutory classification as violative of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. at 226. The
Court in Schweiker noted that it "repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment im-
poses on the Federal Government the same standard required of state legislation by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 226 n.6 (citing Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975) and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78,
81 (1971)).
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patient's care."' Although the majority applied rationality scrutiny,123
the opinion explicitly noted that "[flor these people most subsistence
needs are met by the institution and full benefits are not needed. 1 24
Three other post-Dandridge cases also suggest that the Court is
reluctant to apply Dandridge's deferential rationality scrutiny to laws
that approach a denial of subsistence. In these cases, United States De-
partment of Agriculture v. Moreno, 25 United States Department of Ag-
riculture v. Murry,121 and Wohlgemuth v. Williams,12 7 the Supreme
Court purported to apply rationality scrutiny to laws that totally termi-
nated welfare. 128 In each case, however, the Court found the law to be
irrational and invalidated it as unconstitutional.129 Given that each of
these laws had a conceivable rational basis 30 and that rationality scru-
tiny ordinarily creates a strong presumption that the challenged law is
constitutional,1 3" the results in these cases indicate that the Court was
not actually applying the extremely deferential rationality scrutiny
called for by Dandridge, but rather was applying some form of slightly
122 450 U.S. at 222-25.
123 Id. at 234.
124 Id. at 235 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1971)).
125 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
126 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
127 416 U.S. 901 (1974), affg 366 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
128 In Moreno the Court claimed to apply rationality scrutiny to a federal law that
denied food stamps to any household that contained a member not related to other
members of the household. In Murry the Court purported to apply a rationality stan-
dard of review to a federal law that denied food stamps to any household that contained
a member over 18 years old who was claimed as a dependent child on his parent's
federal income tax return. In Wohigemuth the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a
lower court's application of rationality scrutiny to a Pennsylvania regulation that de-
nied general assistance to unemancipated minors living with an unrelated person, if the
unrelated person did not receive assistance.
229 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538; Wohigemuth, 366 F. Supp. at 549. In Murry, the
Court stated that "[w]e have difficulty in concluding that [the challenged statute] is
rational" and then held that, even assuming arguendo the law was rational, it would
fail under the irrebutable presumption doctrine. Murry, 413 U.S. at 514.
10 See Murry, 413 U.S. at 526 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that law was
rational because parent who claimed child over 18 as dependent could and should sup-
port this older child rather than let him become a public charge); Moreno, 413 U.S. at
545-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that law should be upheld because Con-
gress could rationally have believed that households of related persons live together for
some other purpose than obtaining food stamps).
The challenged regulation in Wohlgemuth denied public assistance to unemand-
pated minors living with an unrelated adult who was not receiving aid. Wohigemuth,
366 F. Supp. at 545. The regulation had a conceivable rational basis inasmuch as the
welfare department rationally could have believed that the regulation would force an
unrelated person, who was not on welfare and who had the means to provide for the
minor, to support the child. To the extent the regulation encouraged a minor to live
with her parents, it rationally served the goal of family cohesiveness.
11 See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 116-2 to 16-3, at 995-96; see also G. GUN-
THER, supra note 3, at 696-704.
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heightened scrutiny."32
These three cases suggest that the Court would apply a higher-
than-rationality level of scrutiny to a denial of subsistence. None of the
cases involved a clear-cut refusal to supply subsistence (since .the plain-
tiffs may have been eligible for more than one form of welfare benefits);
it is difficult to believe that the Court would apply a less stringent stan-
dard of review where such subsistence was clearly in jeopardy. A far
more likely possibility is that some form of intermediate-level review
would be applied.
Dandridge and its progeny indicate that the Court has only ap-
plied rationality scrutiny to uphold welfare laws that do not threaten
an interest in subsistence. The results of Murry, Moreno, and Wohlge-
muth suggest that the Court actually tends to apply a more exacting
standard of review to a total cut-off of welfare that approaches a denial
of subsistence. Thus, intermediate scrutiny can be applied to welfare
laws denying subsistence to sensitive classes without violating the prece-
dent set by Dandridge.
III. APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO Price v. Cohen
The application of intermediate scrutiny is not only theoretically
sound, but can also make a practical difference in the outcome of a
case. To illustrate this, part III will re-examine the facts of Price v.
Cohen.""
As was shown earlier, in Price the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reluctantly applied rationality scrutiny to a Pennsylvania wel-
fare law that terminated welfare for thousands of general assistance
recipients, upholding the law on the grounds that it had a conceivable
rational basis."" The challenged statute classified recipients as either
"chronically" or "transitionally" needy. The transitionally needy were
defined as those between eighteen and forty-five years old who did not
fit into certain exceptions, while the chronically needy were defined as
those over forty-five and those under forty-five who fit into certain cate-
gories. Thus, the primary classification was an age classification. 3 5
's See Medora v. Colautti, 602 F.2d 1149, 1154 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (arguing
that the Court applied "heightened scrutiny" in Murry and Moreno); G. GUNTHER,
supra note 3, at 693-94 (listing Moreno as one of several "exercises of apparently
heightened scrutiny despite avowals of mere rationality standards"); L. TRIBE, supra
note 3, § 16-55, at 1127-28 & n.1 (asserting that in Murry and Moreno the Court
"demanded somewhat more in the way of governmental justification and fairness than
would be required under the traditionally toothless minimum rationality test").
133 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983).
134 See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
13s Price, 715 F.2d at 89-90.
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Whereas the chronically needy were entitled to year-round public assis-
tance, the transitionally needy were eligible for only three months of
public assistance a year.138
Under this Comment's proposal, intermediate equal protection
scrutiny should be applied to welfare laws in which the statutory classi-
fication (1) denies subsistence (2) to a sensitive class. Since the law cuts
off the transitionally needy from welfare after three months and since
there are no adequate alternate sources of public or private assistance,
the statute has a subsistence-threatening effect. 187 Thus the first crite-
rion is satisfied. The second criterion is also fulfilled; the statutory clas-
sification is sensitive because it is based on an inaccurate stereotype that
younger welfare recipients can find work more easily than older recipi-
ents and thus are less deserving of welfare.138 Furthermore, the statu-
tory classification tends to create an underclass by denying the transi-
tionally needy the most basic tools of self-help.
Underlying the statutory classification of the transitionally needy
as those recipients under forty-five years old who do not fit into certain
exceptions is a legislative assumption that younger welfare recipients
can more easily find jobs if they so desired. Although this might be true
of the general population, no statistical correlation between age and
employability was adduced in support of the Pennsylvania statute. The
classification embodies a prejudicial and conclusory stereotype of "lazy"
younger welfare recipients.
The court in Price stated that "the plaintiffs presented the essen-
tially uncontroverted testimony . . . that the potential employability of
persons who qualified for general assistance was unrelated to age."'
Two highly qualified labor specialists, with particular expertise in em-
ployment problems of the poor,"1 0 had testified before the trial court
that although there is a positive correlation between youth and em-
ployability among the general population, there is absolutely no corre-
lation between age and employability among the welfare population.4
136 Id. at 89.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22; see also Price, 715 F.2d at 90-91.
I" This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that the
deferential rational relationship test must be applied to age classifications. See Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307 (1976). The transitionally needy classification involves much more than an age
classification; it embodies traditional stereotypes about the characteristics of people who
receive public assistance.
113 Price, 715 F.2d at 95.
140 See Appendix, supra note 21, at 55a; see also Appeal from the Order of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Supplemental
Appendix, at 231a-232a, Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited
as Supplemental Appendix].
141 Appendix, supra note 21, at 40a-42a; Supplemental Appendix, supra note
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Welfare recipients, who tend to have low levels of education and job
skills, tend to be eligible for only very low-level jobs that require little
training.14 Since employers must provide little training in such jobs,
they have less of an investment in the employee. Employers have less
incentive to discriminate against older job applicants who have fewer
employable years ahead of them. In contrast, the general population, by
virtue of its higher level of education and job skills, is eligible for
higher-level jobs with significant training costs that give an incentive
for employers to discriminate against older job applicants.143 Thus,
once the focus is upon individuals lacking education and job skills, age
does not affect the chances of finding a job. 44
Testimony presented by the state in Price in support of the age
classification was extremely weak. The principal witness who spoke in
behalf of the classification was an expert in the biological aging of fruit
flies, who conceded that he was not a labor expert. 45 He further con-
ceded that the statistics he presented showing a correlation between age
and employability were based on the general population, not the wel-
fare population. 46
In addition, the statute tends to create an underclass by denying
the transitionally needy the most essential tools of self-help. An affida-
vit by Daniel Stone, Executive Director of Adult and Family Services
in the Philadelphia Department of Public Welfare, illustrates this effect
of the statute.1,4 Stone testified that the city of Philadelphia provides
shelter only for a period of five days to two weeks to those who have
been terminated from state general assistance. After that, "the individ-
ual must leave." Furthermore, Stone asserted, "Our experience demon-
strates that these individuals then become residents of the streets, aban-
doned cars, abandoned buildings, and the parks. 148
A person forced to live in the street, with no source of income but
begging or picking from garbage cans, is effectively foreclosed from im-
proving his position through self-effort. Such severe destitution prevents
a person keeping his clothes or body clean and thus makes finding em-
ployment extremely unlikely since she would be unpresentable at a job
140, at 233a-234a.
141 Supplemental Appendix, supra note 140, at 239a-241a.
141 Id. at 237a-239a.
14 Id. at 241a.
145 Id. at 265a-266a; see also Price v. Cohen, 565 F. Supp. 657, 660 (E.D. Pa.),
rev'd, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983).
146 Supplemental Appendix, supra note 140, at 289a. See also Price v. Cohen, 565
F. Supp. 657, 660 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983).
147 Appendix, supra note 21, at 113a-117a.
148 Id. at 113a-114a.
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interview. Hunger and depression resulting from this deprivation could
also seriously impede a job search.
Even during the indigents' short stay at municipal shelters, their
extreme poverty presents an almost insuperable barrier to improving
their position by finding a job. Stone testified that "shelter residents
. . . very much want to work' but that they are provided with no fi-
nancial assistance to buy "items for personal care [such as] soap, razors
[or] kotex. . . . [W]ithout these items, [The residents] are unpresent-
able for job interviews. ' 149 Furthermore, Stone testified that sheltered
indigents lack "funds to look for employment" and "do not have money
to make telephone calls or to take [public transportation] to job
interviews."'
1 5 0
Affidavits from private hospices presented an equally bleak pic-
ture. The hospices cannot possibly meet the huge demand created by
the cutoff of the transitionally needy and are forced to make destitute
men, women, and children leave after two or three weeks. 5 According
to these affidavits, many of these so-called transitionally needy "now
live in the street, parks and in graveyards," or else in abandoned cars
or houses.' 52 "[Ojnce people get 'on the street' they develop physical
and emotional problems which make them much more difficult to
rehabilitate."' 53
The overall picture that emerges is one of brutal deprivation that
effectively renders the transitionally needy incapable of improving their
position through their own effort. The statute creates an underclass by
denying people the most fundamental tools of self-help.'5
14 Id. at 115a-116a.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 118a-126a.
151 Id. at 119a; see also id. at 123a.
168 Id. at 125a-126a.
154 Whether the transitionally needy display the other two characteristics which
can identify a sensitive class is more debatable. It is not clear that the transitionally
needy are being penalized for at trait over which they have no control. On the one
hand, the transitionally needy have no control over the general high unemployment
rate. Also, they are not responsible for their age, and the primary distinction between
the chronically and transitionally needy is based on age. On the other hand, one reason
that welfare recipients tend to be unemployable is their low level of education and work
experience, for which they have some responsibility. When their job prospects are
harmed by long histories of drug addiction or criminal convictions, individual responsi-
bility is even greater.
Nor is it clear that the transitionally needy qualify as sensitive by virtue of dis-
playing the traits of a suspect group but in milder form. Since the transitionally needy
classification is a legislative innovation, the group has not suffered from any history of
purposeful unequal treatment directed against them as a discrete class.
On the other hand, the challenged statute constitutes a serious legislative setback
for the transitionally needy, indicating that they are politically powerless. In any event,
the statute results in such serious deprivation to the transitionally needy that it creates a
1984)
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Since the transitionally needy display one or more of the traits that
identify a sensitive group, they constitute a sensitive classification. In
these circumstances, where subsistence is being denied to a sensitive
class, intermediate scrutiny of the relevant statute should be employed.
In order to apply intermediate equal protection review, a court must
identify the purposes served by the law, determine whether they are
important, and decide whether the statutory classification is substan-
tially related to these government objectives.
In Price v. Cohen, the Third Circuit held that the state purposes
served by the law are "to reallocate scarce welfare resources to those
most in need, to encourage those best able to adjust to become indepen-
dent and self-supporting, and to discourage fraud." ' 5 Applying ration-
ality scrutiny, the Price court held that these were legitimate state
goals.15" These goals are also important, so they fulfill one criterion
under the intermediate level of equal protection review.
In Price the court correctly held that the legislature could have
rationally believed that the statutory classification served these goals. 5
The Pennsylvania legislature heard testimony from the state Secretary
of Welfare, who testified that most welfare recipients whom she consid-
ered employable were under the age of forty.' 58 It also heard testimony
from Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts, who outlined his state's ex-
perience with welfare reduction programs, and recommended that
Pennsylvania retain general assistance for those forty-five and older.'59
Although this testimony to the legislature indicates that the statu-
tory classification has a conceivable rational basis,O'° it does not estab-
lish a substantial relation between the legislative means and ends. In-
deed, the testimony of the labor experts at trial demonstrated that the
assumption that younger welfare recipients can more easily find work
is false because there is no statistical correlation between age and em-
serious obstacle to them ever effectively organizing to increase their political power.
155 Price, 715 F.2d at 94.
15 Id.
115 Id. at 96.
158 Supplemental Appendix, supra note 140, at 297a-298a.
159 Price, 715 F.2d at 95; see also Appendix, supra note 21, at 25a-27a.
160 To say that the age classification not only had a conceivable rational basis but
also represented an inaccurate, prejudicial stereotype is not inconsistent. Many
prejudices have a conceivable rational basis. For example, one stereotype that the Nazis
exploited was that Jews were Communists. This prejudice had a conceivable rational
basis since Jews were heavily represented on the first Politburo in Russia after the
1917 revolution and Jews were also prominent in the socialist uprisings in Germany
after the First World War. For a discussion of the problem of distinguishing between
prejudicial stereotypes that trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny and loose-fit-
ting generalizations that pass constitutional muster under rationality scrutiny, see infra
note 174..
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ployability of welfare recipients.
Here, the distinction between rationality and intermediate review
becomes crucial. Under rationality review, a court cannot reject a legis-
lative viewpoint as "pure speculation" 16 1 or require the state "'to ver-
ify [its] logical assumptions with statistical evidence.' "162 Under inter-
mediate review, however, the Court has inquired at length into
statistical correlations between the statutory classifications and goals
and has required that the state present "credible supporting evidence"
for its classification.' 8 Applying intermediate scrutiny, Plyler held that
"the State must support its selection of this group as the appropriate
target for exclusion."'"
In Price the state failed to make such a showing. The testimony by
the state's expert, in light of contrary evidence by the labor experts,
simply does not constitute credible supporting evidence that the statu-
tory classification serves to reallocate scarce welfare resources to the
most needy. Nor did the state present "credible supporting evidence" to
demonstrate that the classification substantially furthered the goals of
encouraging self-dependency and discouraging fraud. A labor expert
testified that, since welfare recipients are disadvantaged by low levels of
job skills and education, their chances of finding work within the three
months before they are terminated from general assistance may be as
low as between ten and twenty percent.1 6 5 As the district court noted in
Price v. Cohen, "A person faced with no general assistance benefits and
no employment prospects cannot learn self-dependence." 66 The district
court rejected the suggestion of state's counsel that the transitionally
needy "could turn to friends and relatives for support," noting that the
goal of self-dependence is not furthered in this manner.
167
Finally, the state presented no evidence 6 8 indicating that younger
161 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
162 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110 n.28 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976)).
168 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
1" Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982).
165 Supplemental Appendix, supra note 140, at 246a.
a" Price v. Cohen, 565 F. Supp. 657, 662 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir.
1983).
167 Id. at 661-62.
'" The Court for of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Price asserted that the state
Secretary of Welfare, in testimony before the Pennsylvania legislature, "offered statis-
tics purporting to show that these younger recipients ... were much more likely to
engage in welfare fraud." 715 F.2d at 95. This assertion appears to be unfounded. A
survey of the legislative testimony to which the court referred, see Supplemental Ap-
pendix, supra note 140, at 293a-337a, indicates that this legislative testimony did not
include any statistics or arguments that younger recipients were more likely to commit
fraud than older recipients.
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welfare recipients were more likely to engage in fraud than older recip-
ients. The only evidence that remotely related to this issue was testi-
mony by the state Secretary of Welfare to the Pennsylvania legislature
indicating that forty-four percent of welfare fraud cases involved gen-
eral assistance (the welfare assistance curtailed by the challenged stat-
ute in Price).1"9 However, this testimony did not indicate that younger
recipients were more likely to commit fraud. Although the classification
apparently would reduce fraud by removing approximately 60,000 to
90,000 transitionally need from general assistance,11 0 no evidence was
presented that the exclusion of these younger recipients would reduce
fraud more than any other arbitrary exclusion of 60,000 to 90,000
recipients.
Since the statutory classification in Pennsylvania's welfare statute
is not substantially related to important state ends, it would be struck
down under the intermediate standard of equal protection review.
CONCLUSION
Judicial review always has drawbacks in a democratic system pre-
mised on majority rule and government by elected representatives be-
cause judicial review is often countermajoritarian and unrepresentative.
Indeed, given these costs, judicial review is justifiable only when neces-
sary to protect constitutional values that have been trampled by the
majoritarian process.
Unfortunately, judicial review of equal protection challenges to
legislation is hard to justify in this respect. The mandate that all per-
sons are entitled to equal protection of the laws is a noble sentiment
largely devoid of content.17 The equal protection clause requires that
people who are similarly situated in all relevant respects be treated
equally,1 72 but it does not define what respects are relevant when deter-
mining whether people are similarly situated. 73 Inevitably, in applying
'" Supplemental Appendix, supra note 140, at 299a.
170 See Brief for Appellees, supra note 19, at 2 n.1 (discussing how many transi-
tionally needy would be terminated by the challenged statute). Even though the state
produced no evidence that younger recipients were more likely to commit fraud, the
court was still correct in holding that the Pennsylvania legislature could have rationally
believed that the statutory classification furthered the goal of reducing fraud. Such a
view has a conceivable rational basis if criminal behavior among adults in general tends
to be positively correlated with young adulthood.
171 See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. Rv. 537 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Tussman
& tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
17 For example, most judges would agree that people whose last names begin
with different letters are similarly situated with respect to law that grants welfare bene-
fits, but that people with a job and people without employment are not.
[Vol. 132:1547
WELFARE LAWS
the equal protection clause, judges must make substantive value choices,
guided largely by their intuitive sense of what is just, to decide whether
people who differ in a certain trait are similarly situated in all relevant
respects with regard to a particular statutory purpose.174
Heightened equal protection scrutiny, whether strict or intermedi-
ate, is a potent weapon that can easily be used to strike down legislative
enactments and one that must be carefully controlled. This Comment
responds to the need fo sharply limit judicial interventionism under the
equal protection clause. In a fashion similar to the Court's decision in
Plyler v. Doe, 17 5 intermediate scrutiny should only be applied in a nar-
row range of circumstances where the denial of subsistence (an impor-
tant interest with a close nexus to constitutional rights) would result in
the discriminatory infringement of the constitutional rights of a disfa-
vored group and where the disfavored group has "sensitive" character-
istics that indicate that the classification is likely to reflect prejudice.
Both the breadth of review-the range of circumstances in which the
274 See Westen, supra note 171, at 543-48. Tribe has noted that the principle of
equality "makes non-circular commands and imposes non-empty constraints only to the
degree that we are willing to posit substantive ideals to guide collective choice." L.
TIBE, supra note 3, § 16-1, at 991.
Jeffrey Blattner has written an excellent article analyzing how the Court has ap-
plied five models of equal protection: protecting minorities from prejudice, requiring
rationality, protecting specially disadvantaged groups, validating procedural equal pro-
tection, and mandating equal treatment with respect to fundamental interests. See
Blattner, supra note 98. Blattner concludes that each of these models are "'imperfect'
in that they are dependent of an externally supplied vision of a proper allocation of
rights and responsibilities among the branches of government, and between the govern-
ment and the individual." According to Blattner, "[Tihe Court's recent equal protection
decisions are. . . explicable only in terms of a judicially concealed substantive vision,
described here as 'just and unjust disadvantaging."' Id. at 780.
Blattner points out that the Court has been justifying heightened equal protec-
tion-both strict and intermediate-by the need to protect minorities from prejudice.
See id. at 804-08. Yet he criticizes "prejudice" as an empty idea: "[w]hat is subsumed
in the concept of 'prejudice' is a set of value judgments about when the government
may or may not treat particular groups or individuals unequally. Only a judicially
supplied definition of 'just and unjust disadvantaging' can give meaning to the . . .
concept of prejudice." Id. at 812.
Blattner's critique is especially relevant to this Comment inasmuch as the Com-
ment, like Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), treats statutory use of a stereotype as
an indication that the classification is sensitive and thus should be subjected to height-
ened scrutiny. See supra text accompanying note 138. Nothing distinguishes a stereo-
type that triggers intermediate scrutiny from an overbroad, loose-fitting classification
that is permissible under rationality scrutiny, except some externally supplied substan-
tive vision that it is wrong to classify on the basis of a certain trait. See also The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063,
1075 (1980) ("[Tlhe conclusion that a legislative classification reveals prejudicial ste-
reotypes must, at bottom, spring from a disagreement with the judgments that lie be-
hind the stereoope.") These considerations indicate that the application of equal protec-
tion review necessarily involves infusion of judicially-supplied substantive values.
175 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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heightened review its applicable-and the depth of review-the rigor-
ousness of the scrutiny applied-should be tightly restrained.
When particularly harsh welfare laws deny subsistence to a group
with sensitive characteristics, the intermediate tier of review can be an
important tool for the judiciary in scrutinizing those laws. For, after all
the theoretical arguments have been made, it is important not to lose
sight of the human tragedy of denials of subsistence. The plight of the
tens of thousands of destitute Pennsylvanians, cut off from assistance by
the statute challenged in Price v. Cohen,"~e is well illustrated by the
deprivation confronting Tammy Craig, a named plaintiff in that case:
Tammy Craig is 35. She grew up in Florida where she at-
tended a rural school for three years. She is unable to read,
write or count. She has twice been employed as a security
guard but was terminated when she was unable to take
down telephone messages. In 1979, at the suggestion of the
Department [of Public Welfare], she attended literacy classes
for three months. She was cut off from general assistance in
April as "transitionally" needy and was told that "there are
no exceptions made for people like myself." She has been
rejected from a training class for lack of a high school di-
ploma and rejected from employment because she does not
read, write or count. She will have to vacate her living
quarters for failure to pay rent. "Shortly I will have no
home, no food to eat and no place to go. What am I to
do?"""
176 715 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g Price v. Cohen, 565 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
177 Brief for Appellees, supra note 19, at 29 (summarizing affidavit by Tammy
Craig in Appendix, supra note 21, at 154a-155a).
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